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On étudie ici l'effet de la responsabilité des banques pour les dommages
environnementaux causés par leurs clients. Les tribunaux qui rendent les banques
responsables de la réparation des dommages poursuivent le double objectif de
trouver un payeur et de faire pression sur les partenaires des firmes qui peuvent
inciter ces dernières à la réduction des risques. On étudie l'impact que de tels
jugements peuvent avoir sur les relations de financement et sur les incitations à la
prévention dans un environnement où les banques ne peuvent s'engager à toujours
refinancer la firme. À la suite d'un accident environnemental, les banques
légalement responsables sont plus enclines à refinancer la firme en cause. On
montre alors que la responsabilité bancaire facilite le refinancement, améliorant
ainsi le partage de risque obtenu par la firme. Mais, par là-même, elle diminue les
incitations des firmes à la prévention. On montre également que lorsqu'il y a
responsabilité bancaire, le montant investi en technologie de prévention correspond
à l'optimum privé. Si le niveau d'investissement socialement efficace est supérieur
au niveau optimal privé, l'absence de responsabilité bancaire, qui pousse les firmes
à surinvestir en capacité de prévention, peut être socialement désirable.
This paper studies the impact of banks’ liability for environmental
damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks
liable for environmental damages have two objectives: (1) finding someone to pay
for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm’s stakeholders to incite it to
invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal
decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to
reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to
refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident,
liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank
liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving
the firm’s risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm’s incentives to invest in
environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability
case. We also show that when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-
commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some
externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient
level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. In that case, making
banks non liable can be socially desirable.
Mots Clés : Environnement, responsabilité bancaire, contrats financiers, non
engagement
Keywords : Environment, bank liability, financial contracts, non-commitment
1 Introduction
In the last ten years, many court settlements in the United States have
been imposing a transfer of liability for environmental damages to banks.
1
These court decisions were made possible by the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). This
law allows judges to turn against any party that could be considered as
an \owner" or an \operator" of the rm responsible for the polluting ac-
cident. Banks that have close relationships with their debtor rms and
that can have a say in their administrative decisions can therefore be
considered as \operators". The legislator's objective in designing CER-
CLA was primarily to allow courts to nd a party who could pay for
environmental damages when liable rms go bankrupt.
2
This avoids re-
sorting to public funds to compensate victims and repair damages after
environmental accidents caused by insolvent rms' negligence. In fact,
the legislator wishes to declare liable, the deep-pocket stakeholders who
beneted from rms' dangerous activities. Vertically related rms and
nancial partners can then be considered as \operators" and held liable
for damages.
The obligation, however, to turn against rms' partners underlines
the fact that rms are not fully insured against environmental risks. If
rms can assume small environmental accidents without going bankrupt,
it is more dicult to deal with large accidents that can have catastrophic
consequences that could lead to the liable rm's bankruptcy. Such acci-
dents classied as \major technological risks" have low probabilities of
realization but highly prejudicial consequences. For example, industrial
accidents involving nuclear, oil, or chemical spills are major technolog-
ical risks. For that reason, even insurance companies may not be able
to assume those risks because they cannot easily compute fair premia
for those low frequency accidents. Furthermore, they cannot commit to
pay indemnities for eventually very large damages that could easily over-
weight their reserves. Finally, rms protected by limited liability have
low incentives to buy insurance for the value of damages when these
are greater than their asset value. Consequently, rms are often not or
incompletely insured against major environmental risks and liabilities
have to be determined ex post and settled by court judgments.
A second objective for making banks liable for their clients' neg-
ligence is to incite them into giving their clients strong incentives for
taking greater care for the environment. If banks have a seat on rms'
1
For more details on these settlements, see Goble (1992) or Boyer and Laont
(1995) for Canadian cases.
2
For more details on the CERCLA, see Olexa (1991) or Henderson (1994).
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administrative boards, it can be useful to give them concern about en-
vironmental care. The legislator then expects banks to monitor rms'
activities and especially their environmental risk prevention policy. The
reason why rms have not themselves the right incentives for environ-
mental risk reduction is that their liability for environmental accidents
is limited by the bankruptcy possibility. In the case of bankruptcy, vic-
tims' compensation has priority over creditors' claims. But the amount
of damages that can be claimed from rms by courts cannot be higher
than their asset value. The incentives they have to take preventive mea-
sures are limited to this value. In the case of major risks, it is usually
lower than the social cost of damages. Firms then only take into account
the reduction of a loss risk of the asset value and not of the entire value
of social damages. They are, therefore, not internalizing completely the
consequences of environmental accidents. Imposition of environmental
liability to banks can be seen as a way to relax the rm's limited liability
constraint by allowing the internalization of damages by the bank/rm
duo. For this to be ecient, nancial contracts between banks and rms
have to give appropriate incentives to those who take environmental de-
cisions.
Imposition of proper incentives through nancial contracts depends
on the informational environment contracts are signed in. Suppose, rst,
that the risk reduction investment is observable and veriable by banks.
This implies that covenants in nancial contracts can impose a specic
level of investment. Beard (1990) shows that, when no bank is involved,
limited liability can have two opposite eects on rms' incentives to
invest in risk reduction technologies.
3
On one hand, as the expected
payment, due to limited liability, is less than the real expected damage,
the marginal benet of prevention is too small and the rm underinvests.
But, on the other hand, because less resources are invested in productive
activity, more risk reduction investment decreases the amount the rm
loses in case of bankruptcy. This eectively entails overinvestment. This
second eect is very dependent on the form of the ex post damages
distribution and the dominant eect is generally the underinvestment
one. In this case, the introduction of nancial contracts has to provide
incentives in order to avoid the limited liability eect. Segerson and
Tietenberg (1992) show that, in a complete information-no bankruptcy
environment, liability could be imposed as well on the bank as on the rm
to generate optimal incentives.
4
This means that transfers between the
3
In this model, the amount of damages as well as the accident's realization are
random.
4
In fact they consider a principal-agent contract between a rm and its manager
but it is easy to transpose it to the case of a bank/rm relationship.
2
parties can oset adverse liability eects in order to preserve incentives
as well as participation interest.
When the risk reduction investment cannot be observed by the bank,
however, nancial contracts can no longer include covenants that would
specify a level of investment. In that case, liability has to be given
to the rm. If not, the contract is not able to preserve incentives. This
result highlights two important points. First, moral hazard on prevention
eorts will annihilate the incentive eects of bank liability. Second, the
principle of rms' limited liability prevents the legislator from providing
incentives by giving liability to rms. Moral hazard and limited liability
are the two reasons given in the literature to explain why bank liability is
not the perfect mechanism for providing risk reduction incentives. Boyer
and Laont (1997) show that, in a moral hazard environment, partial
bank liability is preferable to complete liability. They use a two-period
model with preventive eort to be made by the rm in the rst period,
a possible accident taking place in the second, and nancing required in
both periods. If eort is fully observable, complete bank liability entails
the socially optimal prevention eort and nancing behavior at the Nash
equilibrium of the contract. But if eort is not observable, the monopoly
bank has to abandon rents to the rm. The usual trade-o between rent
extraction and incentives leads to sub-optimal levels of nancing and
eort. The authors then show that the equilibrium allocation could be
closer to rst best, if bank liability could be restricted to a fraction of
the damages. Pitchford (1995) also nds that partial bank liability is
the best solution. In a one period-moral hazard model, bank liability
induces nancial contracts to impose risk premia to rms in the no-
accident states. This reduces the rms' incentives to reach those states,
hence it reduces their eort. Pitchford concludes that the ecient level
of bank liability is equal to the rm's asset value. This is equivalent to
recommending a no bank liability solution.
In this paper, we introduce several features which have, to some ex-
tent, been ignored in the literature and which are likely to aect how
bank liability interacts with risk reduction investment. Bank liability
following an environmental accident determines the bank's incentives to
renance the rm. The expectation of such renancing should aect the
ex ante investment the rm makes to reduce environmental risk. So,
we rst introduce in our model dynamics to explicitly take into account
the bank's renancing decision. Second, we assume that the rm is risk
averse so that it is averse to environmental risk and it values renanc-
ing following an environmental accident.
5
Assuming that the rm is
5
It can be argued that when managers as well as workers are risk averse, they
3
risk averse produces the intuitive result that the threat of bankruptcy
induces the rm in overinvesting to avoid it. This is not always the
case in models with risk neutrality; in these models, limited liability and
bankruptcy usually induce the rm in underinvesting instead of overin-
vesting to avoid the risk, and this, because the rm is not responsible
for losses in bankrupt states.
With the introduction of dynamics and risk aversion, we can show
that bank liability is not necessarily a good way to provide incentives
for risk reduction eorts. Our conclusion, however, does not rest on the
rm's limited liability constraint, nor on the asymmetric information en-
vironment. It results from the parties' inability to commit to long-term
nancial contracts. Risk averse rms have incentives to smooth their
income through time as well as through states of nature. Because of the
incompleteness of markets, rms cannot perfectly insure through the
use of nancial securities. But they can enter into long-term relation-
ships with nancial intermediaries in order to achieve some smoothing of
their payos. These long-term relationships emerge through contractual
agreements that nance rms' projects as well as share their risks. Fur-
thermore, it is highly relevant to study the problem of bank liability with
long-term contracts because they imply a close relationship between the
bank and the rm and therefore justify the fact that a court can ex post
consider the bank as a rm \operator".
Formally, we assume that the bank cannot commit to maintain the
relationship if it is not in its interest to do so. This implies that the
bank accepts to renance the rm in states of nature where its income is
low only if this renancing is marginally protable. Contracts that sat-
isfy this constraint are called \self-enforcing contracts". Self-enforcing
nancial arrangements cannot usually implement the rst-best alloca-
tion. Under such contracts, the extent of risk-sharing and smoothing
depends on the bank's autarcic opportunities. We show that bank lia-
bility transforms its autarcic payo. Bank liability eectively relaxes its
self-enforcing constraints, thus providing better risk-sharing to the rm.
This implies that the rm gets reduced incentives for environmental risk
reduction investment. The intuition is that, under imperfect nancial
contracts, nancial transfers and the risk reduction investment become
imperfect substitute. As the bank can provide better insurance, the rm
reduces its investment.
We solve our model for two distinct cases. First, we assume that the
value of the rm remains positive following an environmental accident.
inuence the management decisions either directly (for the manager) or indirectly
through labor contract negotiations. Consequently, rms behave as if they were risk-
averse.
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Second, we study the opposite case where the value of the rm becomes
negative following the accident. Bank liability cases observed in real life
are cases following the bankruptcy of liable rms. Unable to recover
damage costs from the bankrupt rm, judges have put the burden on
deep-pocket partners, as soon as they can be partially responsible for the
accident. In fact, when the rm can pay for damages or when its liquida-
tion value is sucient to cover the damages, creditors are not called for
(but in fact they always lose their priority as victims of environmental
accidents are payed before creditors following the rm's bankruptcy).
Then, the apparent role of laws as CERCLA appears only in the case
of bankruptcy. But in fact, because of the possibility of bank ex post
liability, sealed in the law, the ex ante form of contracts has to take
bank liability into account. This is why there is no need for an actual
bankruptcy for bank liability to have an eect on nancial contracts.
This is why we study the two cases.
In the following section, we present the model. Section 3 charac-
terizes the optimal contract when the environmental accident cannot
cause the rm's bankruptcy. It rst describes the privately optimal so-
lution, that is, the risk-sharing and level of prevention obtained in the
contract when there are no self-enforcing constraints. It then presents
the self-enforcing contract's solution as a function of the level of bank
liability. Section 4 discusses the same contract when the environmental
accident can cause the rm's bankruptcy. In a last section, we discuss
bank liability by comparing the risk reduction investment achieved in a
self-enforcing contract with bank liability and the socially optimal one.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
There are three periods over which a bank and a rm interact. In pe-
riod t = 1, the rm faces two sources of risks. First, the net income
y
s
that the rm receives is stochastic. There are S possible states of
income indexed by s 2 S = f1; 2;    ; Sg. Denote by q
s
the proba-
bility of state s and assume that 0 < y
1
< y
2
<    < y
S
. We note
y =
P
S
s=1
q
s
y
s
= E
s
y
s
the expected value of income. The second risk
is an environmental risk. In the case of an environmental accident, the
rm is potentially liable for an amount X for reparation of the dam-
ages (decontamination, compensation of the possible victims, ...). The
probability of the environmental accident is p(I) where I 2 R
+
is an ob-
servable investment in prevention technology made by the rm in period
t = 0. The probability p(I) is decreasing and convex: p
0
< 0 and p
00
> 0.
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We suppose that the absence of investment cannot make the accident
systematic, that is, p(0) < 1. On the other hand, the risk cannot be
completely eliminated, that is, p(I) > 0 for all I . The investment cost
is K(I) and we assume that K is strictly increasing and convex: K
0
> 0
and K
00
> 0, with K(0) = 0. We suppose that damages X are large rel-
ative to income but have a relatively low probability of realization, that
is, X > y
s
and p(0)X < y
s
for all s 2 S. A state of nature in period
t = 1 is then represented by a pair (s; x) with s 2 S and x 2 f0; Xg.
There are 2S possible realizations. Note that under our assumptions,
y
1
,X <    < y
S
,X < y
1
<    < y
S
.
In period t = 2, the rm faces only an income risk where y
z
, z 2 S,
denotes its income. In this period, its income is identically and indepen-
dently distributed as that in the rst period.
6
The rm is risk-averse and its preferences over dividends
7
are repre-
sented by a separable utility function u, strictly increasing and strictly
concave: u
0
> 0 and u
00
< 0. The bank is risk neutral and its utility is
equal to its income. The two parties discount the future by a factor .
There are gains to trade between the rm and the bank because the
risk averse rm has an interest in sharing its risk and smoothing its
dividends with the bank. To achieve this, the bank and the rm sign
a nancial contract in period t = 0 which species the investment level
and the rm's contingent dividends. Denote by c
sx
1
the rm's dividend
in period t = 1 in state (s; x) and by c
z
2
(s; x), its second period dividend
level when income y
z
is realized in period 2 and state (s; x) occurred in
the rst period. In periods t = 1 and t = 2, the expected income y is
split between the bank and the rm. If c is the dividend level allowed
to the rm by the contract in one period, then the bank is given the
dierence between c and the realized level y of income if there is no
environmental accident. In the case of an accident, the bank gets the
dierence between c and y ,X . We assume that the bank operates in
a competitive environment. Initially, it therefore accepts every contract
that yields a non-negative expected surplus. Finally, we must assume
that the rm's net actual value NAV is positive for all investment levels
of interest, that is,
NAV = (1 + )y ,K(I), p(I)X > 0:
This condition ensures that the rm can secure some initial nancing for
its investment I .
6
The period t = 2 is introduced to make non trivial the decision to bankrupt or
not the rm following an environmental accident in the rst period.
7
Here, the dividend is equal to the net income y
s
plus nancial transfers.
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Informally, a contract species the amount which is initially nanced
by the bank in period t = 0, and the schedule of reimbursement over
the next two periods, t = 1 and t = 2. At the end of period t = 1, the
rm realizes its income y
s
,x. For smoothing purposes, it may renance
with the bank with a scheduled reimbursement in period t = 2.
In a world of perfect nancial markets, liability rules only serve to
internalize environmental damages, and the identity of the liable party
is not important per se. We therefore assume that markets are imperfect
in the sense that the bank cannot commit to the contract if it is not in its
interest to do so. As a consequence, if the bank's expected surplus from
the contract at the beginning of period t = 1, when the state of nature
has been realized, is lower than what it can get outside of the contract
(in autarky), it breaks its relationship with the rm. Consequently,
the optimal contract has to specify transfers that give the bank the
incentives to stay in the contract. Formally, self-enforcing constraints
are introduced in the design of the optimal contract. These constraints
guarantee that, in each possible state of nature, the transfer is such that
the bank prefers to make it than to breach the contract and return to
autarky. These constraints have the following general form:
y
s
, x, c
sx
1
+ [y , E
z
c
z
2
(s; x)]  aut(s; x):
The term y
s
, x , c
sx
1
represents the bank's current net transfer while
y,E
z
c
z
2
(s; x) represents its discounted expected reimbursement. The
left-hand side of the constraint therefore represents what the bank gets
by staying in the contract following state (s; x). For the bank to stay in
the contract, this has to be greater than what it can get in autarky in
the same state, denoted by aut(s; x). There are as many self-enforcing
constraints as states of nature in period t = 1, that is, 2S. Note that
these constraints are more likely to be binding when the current net
transfer is negative, that is, when the bank provides additional nancing
to the rm.
The liability rule aects what the bank can get in autarky. In the ab-
sence of bank liability, aut(s; x) = 0, where 0 is the assumed reservation
utility for the bank. When the bank is liable, the legislator can oblige
it to pay an amount k as compensation or penalty after an accident due
to the project it nances. Then, even if the bank decides not to re-
nance the rm after the accident, and hence to \breach" the contract, a
court can still force it to remain liable since it was an \operator" of the
rm at the time of the accident. This obligation transforms the autarky
condition to aut(s; x) = ,k. Bank liability therefore relaxes the bank's
self-enforcing constraint.
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The solution for the optimal nancial contract not only depends on
the liability rules but also on the ex post value of the rm following an
accident. Depending on the size of X , the accident can entail ex post
bankruptcy or not. When the accident is not suciently harmful, that is,
when y
s
,X + y  0, bankruptcy is not optimal regardless of liability
rules since it is always ecient to keep the rm operating. We show
below, however, that the liability rules announced by the legislator in
period t = 0 aects the optimal nancial contract, even when bankruptcy
is not optimal (the no-bankruptcy case).
If y
s
, X + y < 0, then, in a state where an accident occurs, the
value of the rm becomes negative. In the absence of rules making either
the bank or the rm liable for the environmental damages X , the rm
goes bankrupt to avoid paying for the damages and society supports
the environmental costs. Bankruptcy is then privately optimal. The
introduction of bank liability reverses the decision as damages have to
be paid for regardless of whether the rm goes bankrupt or not. In this
case, bankruptcy is not privately optimal since y
s
+ y > 0.
The object of the paper is to compare the levels of investment in en-
vironmental prevention under alternative liability rules and bankruptcy
assumptions. Before proceeding to the analysis, we make another as-
sumption. We suppose that, in period t = 2, both parties are fully
committed to the terms of the contract. This assumption allows us to
keep the model tractable and focus on the role of non-commitment (in
the rst period) on the investment in environmental prevention.
8
We present our results in two steps. First, we study the no-bankruptcy
case in the next section. We then discuss the case where bankruptcy
would be privately optimal in the absence of liability rules (the bankruptcy
case) in Section 4.
3 The no-bankruptcy case
In this section, we study liability rules under the assumption that the
accident is not harmful enough to involve a negative rm value, that is,
that bankruptcy is privately non-optimal. Formally, y
s
,X+y > 0 for
all s. For the purpose of later comparisons, it is useful to rst determine
the optimal contract when the bank can commit to it.
8
This formulation is meant as a reduced form for an innite-horizon model in
which future surplus are used to keep parties bound to the contract. See for example
Thomas and Worrall (1988).
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3.1 The full-commitment contract
In this sub-section, we present the \rst-best" case where the bank can
commit to the contract. In period t = 0, the amount K(I) is lent by
the bank to the rm and invested in the technology. With full commit-
ment, the optimal contract maximizes the rm's expected utility sub-
ject to the bank's participation constraint. The bank's participation
constraint guarantees that its expected surplus from the relationship is
non-negative. The problem can be written as:
max
c
sx
1
;c
z
2
(s;x)
(1  p(I))
 
X
s
q
s
(u(c
s0
1
) + 
X
z
q
z
u(c
z
2
(s; 0)))
!
+
p(I)
 
X
s
q
s
(u(c
sX
1
) + 
X
z
q
z
u(c
z
2
(s;X)))
!
s.t.  K(I) + (1  p(I))
X
s
q
s
[y
s
  c
s0
1
+ 
X
z
q
z
(y
z
  c
z
2
(s; 0))] +
p(I)
X
s
q
s
[y
s
 X   c
sX
1
+ 
X
z
q
z
[y
z
  c
z
2
(s;X))]  0: (1)
Denote by , the Lagrange multiplier associated with the bank's par-
ticipation constraint. Characteristics of the optimal dividend are given
by the rst-order conditions:
 = u
0
(c
sx
1
) = u
0
(c
z
2
(s; x)) 8s; z 2 S; 8x 2 f0; Xg:
Hence, the rm's dividend is perfectly smoothed by the contract. Denote
by c

= c
sx
1
= c
z
2
(s; x) for all s; z 2 S and all x 2 f0; Xg, the constant
dividend level oered by the rst-best contract. Using this result, the
rst-order condition for investment can be written as:
,K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)[(1 + )y ,X , (1 + )c

,((1 + )y , (1 + )c

)] = 0
, K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X = 0:
At the rst-best solution, the rm invests until the marginal cost of in-
vestment is equal to its marginal benet (represented by the diminishing
expected loss). The optimal levels of dividend, c

, and investment, I

,
are jointly determined by:

K
0
(I

) + p
0
(I

)X = 0
(1 + )c

= (1 + )y ,K(I

), p(I

)X;
where this last equality is the bank's participation constraint. Hence,
when the bank's surplus is zero, the rm's discounted dividend is equal
to the rm's value.
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3.2 The self-enforcing contract
We now derive the optimal nancial contract assuming that the bank
cannot commit to the contract. Bank liability is represented by the
penalty k
s
imposed to the bank in state (s;X). This penalty can depend
on the state s because it should be possible for the legislator to make
the bank's liability contingent on the rm's wealth. In particular, courts
should be able to recover from the rm some of the damages before it
appeals to the bank's contribution. For example, k
s
= X,y
s
represents
the case where the court seizes the rm's income, that is, it liquidates
the rm, and makes the bank pay for the dierence between y
s
and X .
The penalty k
s
aects the bank's autarcic opportunity because it is
still liable to pay k
s
even if it breaches the contract. Here, we assume
that k
s
2 [0; X ], therefore encompassing full (k
s
= X for all s), partial
(k
s
< X) or no liability (k
s
= 0).
The optimal contract is the solution to the following maximization
problem.
max
c
sx
1
;c
z
2
(s;x)
(1, p(I))E
s
[u(c
s0
1
) + E
z
u(c
z
2
(s; 0))]
+p(I)E
s
[u(c
sX
1
) + E
z
u(c
z
2
(s;X))]
s.t. ,K(I) + (1, p(I))E
s
[y
s
, c
s0
1
+ E
z
(y
z
, c
z
2
(s; 0))] +
p(I)E
s
[y
s
,X , c
sX
1
+ E
z
(y
z
, c
z
2
(s;X))]  0 (2)
y
s
, c
s0
1
+ E
z
(y
z
, c
z
2
(s; 0))  0 8s 2 S (3)
y
s
,X , c
sX
1
+ E
z
(y
z
, c
z
2
(s;X))  ,k
s
8s 2 S(4)
Let us associate to constraint (2) the Lagrange multiplier , and to the
set of constraints (3) and (4) for all s 2 S, the multipliers q
s

s0
and
q
s

sX
respectively. The rst-order conditions for this problem give an
immediate result on the intertemporal smoothing of dividend.
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Proposition 1. Whatever the liability rule, intertemporal smoothing of
the rm's dividend is always perfectly achieved, that is, for all s 2 S and
all x 2 f0; Xg: c
z
2
(s; x) = c
sx
1
8z.
The contract always species that the dividend in period t = 2 de-
pends only on the realization of period t = 1 state of nature. Full insur-
ance is provided against shocks to the second period income because we
assume that the bank can fully commit to second period transfers. We
note c
z
2
(s; x) = c
sx
1
= c
sx
and rewrite the self-enforcing constraints:
y
s
+ y , (1 + )c
s0
 0 for all s 2 S
y
s
,X + y , (1 + )c
sX
 ,k
s
for all s 2 S:
9
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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Given this result on dividends, the rst-order condition on investment
is:
K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X =
1

p
0
(I)(1 + )E
s
(u(c
sX
), u(c
s0
))
,p
0
(I)(1 + )E
s
(c
sX
, c
s0
)
, K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X = p
0
(I)(1 + )
E
s

u(c
sX
)

, c
sX

,

u(c
s0
)

, c
s0

:
The liability rule does not inuence directly the investment level. There
is, however, an indirect eect. Bank liability aects risk-sharing which,
in turn, inuences the investment level. It is then important to charac-
terize the solution for the dividends before we can solve for the optimal
investment level.
3.2.1 Risk-sharing and dividends
First-order conditions for dividends are given by the following equations
that hold for all s in S.
u
0
(c
s0
) = +

s0
1, p(I)
(5)
u
0
(c
sX
) = +

sX
p(I)
(6)
The bank liability's eect on risk-sharing implicitly appears through the
multipliers 
sx
. A binding self-enforcing constraint in state (s; x) (
sx
>
0) means that it is not possible for the bank to provide the rm with
a dividend higher than c
sx
which satises the self-enforcing constraint
y
s
+y,(1+)c
s0
= 0 or y
s
,X+y,(1+)c
sX
= ,k
s
, without having
the bank leaving the contract. A higher level of c
sx
would actually make
autarky more interesting for the bank. Then, depending on whether the
self-enforcing constraint binds or not, the dividend may be limited by
bank liability or not. If no self-enforcing constraint binds, the rm is
perfectly insured and the solution is the same as in the full-commitment
case.
The next proposition provides some basic properties of the optimal
dividends.
Proposition 2. Dividends c
sx
are weakly increasing in y
s
, x+ k
s
x
X
.
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An optimal contract smooths dividends across states of nature as
much as possible. This is achieved by having dividends lower than in-
come in high income states and higher than it in low income ones when
self-enforcing constraints allow it. These constraints can be written as
(1 + )c
sx
 y
s
, x+ k
s
x=X + y.
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The l.h.s. represents the dividend
payment from the bank to the rm while the r.h.s. represents what the
bank foregoes if it breaches the contract and does not renance the rm.
They are more likely to be binding for low levels of y
s
, x + k
s
x=X .
Because of the contingent liability k
s
, self-enforcing constraints do not
necessarily bind in low income states y
s
, X . When a self-enforcing
constraint is binding, the dividend satises the expression with equality.
For states in which the constraint is not binding, dividends are constant
and (weakly) higher than the highest level for binding states. Dividends
are then weakly increasing in y
s
, x + k
s
x=X . This result allows us to
examine the eect of bank liability on dividends and risk-sharing.
Corollary 1. 1. With no bank liability, dividends are increasing with
y
s
, x;
2. With full bank liability, c
s0
= c
sX
for all s;
3. With partial bank liability, c
s0
 c
sX
for all s.
This corollary follows directly from Proposition 2. In the rst part,
since y
s
,x+ k
s
x=X = y
s
,x for k
s
= 0, it is immediate that dividends
increase with net income y
s
, x. When there is full bank liability, that
is, k
s
= X for all s, all self-enforcing constraints reduce to (1 + )c
sx

y
s
+ y. These are independent of x, which implies that c
s0
= c
sX
for all s. With full bank liability, an environmental accident does not
worsen the renancing problem in period t = 1 as the bank has to
pay for the environmental damage whether it breaches the contract or
not. This implies that dividends are not aected by the occurrence of
an accident. As soon as the bank becomes less liable, however, its self-
enforcing constraints in accident states are more likely to become binding
because the incentives to stay in the relationship are weaker. The rm
then earns a (weakly) higher dividend when there is no accident than
when there is one.
The next subsection uses the properties of optimal dividends to char-
acterize the optimal period t = 0 investment.
10
If x = 0, this reduces to (1 + )c
s0
 y
s
+ y.
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3.2.2 Investment
The insurance possibilities of the contract determine the rm's incentives
to invest in environmental risk prevention. The next proposition shows
that investment depends on the bank liability rule.
Proposition 3. 1. If there is partial, or no bank liability, the rm
overinvests in the risk-reducing technology, compared to the full-
commitment optimal level;
2. If there is full bank liability, the rm invests at the full-commitment
optimal level I

.
We only provide here a sketch of the proof. The rst-order condition
for investment is:
K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X =
1

p
0
(I)(1 + )E
s
(u(c
sX
), u(c
s0
))
,p
0
(I)(1 + )E
s
(c
sX
, c
s0
)
The sign of the right-hand-side term determines the importance of the
investment level I compared to the full-commitment optimal level I

implicitly dened by K
0
(I

) + p
0
(I

)X = 0. The right-hand-side term
is directly related to the eciency of risk-sharing between accident and
no-accident states. We see immediately that full bank liability (k
s
= X),
which allows perfect insurance against environmental accident (c
s0
=
c
sX
), entails an optimal level of investment as the rst-order condition
for investment becomes K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X = 0. As soon as insurance
against states x = X is not complete (c
s0
> c
sX
), the right-hand-side
term is not zero, and the level I is dierent from I

.
This result is very intuitive. In fact, the rm's incentives are directly
related to the rm's wealth in each state of nature. When the rm is
perfectly insured against accident states, it has no incentives to make
special eort to avoid those states. The bank is risk neutral and, hence,
cares only about expected rm value. Since the rm is perfectly insured
against the accident, it behaves in a risk-neutral fashion with respect
to the choice of the contractual investment level. The investment level
is then calculated in order to reduce the risk of loss X that aects the
rm's value, which yields the investment level I

.
As soon as dividends cannot be perfectly smoothed between states
of accident and no accident, however, the rm considers more than the
reduction in rm's value entailed by an environmental accident. It sup-
ports a disutility due to the dierence in dividends between dierent
states and has an incentive to avoid states of low dividends. The rm
13
then increases its investment in order to reduce the probability of acci-
dent. Since the overinvestment reduces the rm value compared to the
full-commitment optimum, the bank reduces the rm's expected level of
dividends. Since the rm is risk-averse, it is always willing to diminish
marginally its level of dividends in exchange for a decrease in the risk it
supports.
When the environmental accident does not cause the rm's bankruptcy,
the exogenous introduction of bank liability in nancial contracts relaxes
the bank's self-enforcing constraints, therefore improving the rm's div-
idend smoothing. The better insured rm has lower incentives to reduce
risk and, hence, it does not distort its investment as much. This makes
the investment level closer to the full-commitment optimal one.
4 The bankruptcy case
In the preceding section, we suppose that there is no possibility of
bankruptcy. Even after an accident, taking the damage costs into ac-
count, the rm value remains positive. We could, however, imagine that
such an important accident would cause the rm's ex post value to be
negative. In that case, the accident annihilates the expected surplus
and autarky may become better than any form of contract with the rm
(depending on the liability rule).
This is the case we analyze in this section, that is, we assume that
y
s
,X + y < 0 for all s. This means that whatever the rm's income,
the occurrence of an accident yields a negative rm value. In the absence
of bank liability, it is not possible to construct a self-enforcing contract
in the accident states. Actually, the self-enforcing constraints should
be written as (3) and (4), but the only way to keep the bank in the
contract in states x = X , would be to have c
sX
1
+E
z
c
z
2
(sX) < 0 in (4).
Firm's limited liability prevents such a solution. The relationship then
inevitably ends after an accident.
If there is a form of bank liability, it is possible to have the bank
renancing the rm after an accident in states s such that y
s
,X+k
s
+
y  0. Depending on the specication of fk
s
g
s
, this can be satised
in some states and not in others. The contract would then end after an
accident in those states s where it is not satised, and continue in the
other states. As the problem must integrate constraints and transfers
only for states in which the relationship continues, it is dependent on the
form of the liability rule. In order to limit the number of specications
(that depend on exogenous specications), we concentrate here only on
the polar cases k
s
= 0 (no bank liability) or k
s
= X (full bank liability)
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for all s. When k
s
= 0 for all s, y
s
,X + k
s
+ y < 0 and the contract
ends following an accident. When k
s
= X for all s, y
s
,X+k
s
+y > 0
and the bank always renances the rm following an accident.
4.1 No bank liability
In the case where k
s
= 0, the contract takes no account of the accident
states. The optimal contract solves the following maximization problem.
max
c
s0
1
;c
z
2
(s;0)
(1, p(I))E
s
[u(c
s0
1
) + E
z
u(c
z
2
(s; 0))]
+p(I)(1 + )u(0)
s.t. ,K(I) + (1, p(I))E
s
[y
s
, c
s0
1
+ E
z
(y
z
, c
z
2
(s; 0))]  0
y
s
, c
s0
1
+ [y , E
z
c
z
2
(s; 0)]  0 8s 2 S:
If we associate Lagrange multipliers  and 
s0
, for all s 2 S, re-
spectively to these constraints, the rst-order conditions give for all s in
S:
c
z
2
(s; 0) = c
s0
1
= c
s0
8z 2 S (7)
u
0
(c
s0
) = +

s0
1 p(I)
(8)
K
0
(I) + (1 + )p
0
(I)
n
y +E
s

u(c
s0
) u(0)

, c
s0
o
= 0: (9)
The optimal contract is similar to that found in the preceding section.
Self-enforcing constraints cannot bind all together. Constraints bind in
higher-income states, and dividends are higher in those states. One can
then write:  = u
0
(c
S0
)  u
0
(c
s0
) for all s.
Conclusions about the eect of non-commitment on investment call
for a comparison of the optimal I given by equation (9) with the level
^
I
obtained in the full-commitment environment.
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In the full-commitment
optimum, 
s0
= 0 and the dividend is constant for all s. The optimal
level of investment is
^
I such that
K
0
(
^
I) + (1 + )p
0
(
^
I)

y +

u(c), u(0)
u
0
(c)
, c

= 0: (10)
The comparison between the investment levels that respectively solve
(9) and (10) is ambiguous. We can show that there exist some specica-
tions of the rm's utility function such that the self-enforcing contract
11
Note that we consider here a full-commitment environment where the rm goes
bankrupt in the same states as in the non-commitment case so that we can compare
the two cases. This implies that the full-commitment optimum is now dependent on
the liability rule, which was not the case in the preceding section.
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involves overinvestment compared to the level an enforceable contract
would entail.
Proposition 4. If K() and p() are such that K(I)=(1 , p(I)) is in-
creasing in I, and if the rm's utility function is any concave function
such that (u(c),u(0))=u
0
(c),c is convex in c, then the self-enforcing con-
tract involves (weak) overinvestment compared to the full-commitment
optimal level
^
I.
For most power functions K and exponential functions p, the ratio
K(I)=(1 , p(I)) is increasing. The condition imposed to that ratio is
then suciently weak for the proposition to be general. The set of
utility functions for which (u(c),u(0))=u
0
(c), c is convex is quite large
too. Any thrice dierentiable, concave and increasing function such that
u
000
 0 satises the condition. It is also convex for all HARA functions
of the form u(c) = (1 , )=(ac=(1 , ) + b)

with a > 0,  6= 1 and
b  0 (which includes CARA as well as CRRA functions). Hence, for
most commonly used utility functions, overinvestment weakly obtains at
the solution of the self-enforcing contract. Overinvestment is strict if
some self-enforcing constraint is binding.
4.2 Bank liability
Let us consider now the full bank-liability case. The bank has to pay X
after an accident independently of what happens in the contract. Self-
enforcing constraints in accident states are then:
y
s
,X + y  c
s0
1
+ E
z
c
z
2
(s;X),X 8s 2 S:
In all states, the bank has incentives to renance the rm since y
s
+y >
0. Since the rm does not go bankrupt after an accident, the resolu-
tion will be exactly the same as for the no-bankruptcy-full-liability case.
When the bank's full liability prevents the bank from taking advantage
of the rm's limited liability, the accident cost is fully internalized. The
contract then has the form described in the preceding section when there
is full bank liability. Hence, investment is at the (no-bankruptcy) full-
commitment level I

.
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4.3 Discussion
The eect of the introduction of bank liability in nancial contracts
when environmental accidents can involve bankruptcy can be seen in
12
It should be clear that partial liability would produce an intermediate case be-
tween the two polar cases analyzed in this section.
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the comparison of investment levels with and without bank liability. We
then compare the level

I obtained from equation (9) (no liability) with
I

(full liability).
K
0
(

I) + p
0
(

I)X = p
0
(

I)[X   (1 + )y] + (1 + )p
0
(

I)
E
s

u(0)
u
0
(c
S0
)
  0

 

u(c
s0
)
u
0
(c
S0
)
  c
s0

(11)
K
0
(I

) + p
0
(I

)X = 0: (12)
In the bankruptcy case, (1 + )y < X , and the rst term in the right-
hand side of (11) is always negative. In the proof of Proposition 3 we
show that the second term is positive. Hence, the sign of equation (11) is
indeterminate. The total eect of bank liability on investment is ambigu-
ous, the absence of bank liability entails either under- or overinvestment
compared to I

, the full bank liability investment.
Because the rm does not go bankrupt when full bank liability is
introduced, the investment level I

can be interpreted as the investment
when there is no limited liability for the rm (X is fully internalized
in the investment decision). The level

I can then be interpreted as
the limited liability investment level. The general intuition suggested
in the literature is that limited liability reduces incentives to invest in
environmental protection. Here, this is not necessarily the case. What
is new in this model is the introduction of risk-averse behavior for the
rm. The rst term of equation (11) represents the general eect of
limited liability, that is, bankruptcy possibilities after accidents reduce
the considered loss from X to (1+)y, which reduces ex ante incentives
to invest. The second term expresses the fact that the risk-averse rm
being imperfectly insured against the accident (because its revenue falls
to zero in that case) has an incentive to invest to avoid this state. The
sum of these two opposite eects cannot be signed here but when X is
not too high compared to (1 + )y and the rm is highly risk-averse,
we may observe a greater investment in environmental prevention when
there is no bank liability as compared to when the bank is fully liable.
5 Social optimum
We have shown that bank liability induces the ecient investment be-
havior as it relaxes its self-enforcing constraints in accident states. We
also showed that a non-liable bank induces a higher investment than
when it is liable. From a social point of view, one has to determine
the socially optimal level of investment before deciding whether banks
should be liable or not.
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The level of investment I

depends on the anticipated cost X of an
accident. The loss X is what the bank and the rm view ex ante as the
cost of damages for the risk they both recognize. It represents what they
anticipate a court will ask for compensation after an accident, given that
they both know what type of accident they are dealing with. A part of
this cost can be calculated without error: it is the value of lost equip-
ments and the actual cost of repair and clean-up entailed by the accident.
The other part is an evaluation of the prejudice suered by outside vic-
tims: it is the amount of money representing a \fair" compensation for
the environmental losses due to the accident. Such compensation can
cover losses which can be directly evaluated using market prices (as in
the case of economic-activity losses for the shery or tourism industry
after an oil spill) and losses which cannot be directly evaluated due to
the absence of relevant prices (as in the case of the disappearance of
animal species or natural sites). There are then two problems for the
calculation of compensation. First, the evaluation of losses can be based
on statistical estimation which yields only an approximation of the true
value. Second, if the loss has an impact in the future (it is still the case
for the disappearance of animal species), it is necessary to agree on the
choice of an appropriate discount rate.
The evaluation of non-market losses is usually based on the contin-
gent valuation method that relies on the survey evaluation of the will-
ingness to pay for the conservation of a particular environmental service
(or the willingness to accept a compensation for the disappearance of
that environmental service).
13
Statistical computations assign a value
for environmental services from the estimated willingness to pay of the
entire population. This method, however, involves a certain number
of biases that make the measured cost imprecise. On top of the usual
econometrics and aggregation biases, surveyed respondents often have a
tendency to overstate their willingness to obtain compensation and to
understate their willingness to pay. The contingent valuation method
may then over- or underestimate the value of a particular environmental
service and, hence, the monetary loss to be paid in compensation.
There is a debate among economists about the choice of an appropri-
ate discount rate for evaluating environmental services.
14
The market
rate of interest is generally used as the discount rate for evaluation of fu-
ture contingencies. Weitzman (1994) argues, however, that the discount
13
It is the most common method because it even takes into account the evaluation
of people who never use the environmental service. This is often called the \passive
value". For a description of that and other methods, see Hanley and Spash (1993).
14
See Hanley and Spash (1993) for the argumentation about the discount rate for
environmental evaluations.
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rate used should be lower than the marginal productivity of capital (the
market rate of interest) because any reduction in today's consumption to
nance investment and, hence, yield a greater production tomorrow, also
entails a greater level of pollution. In that case, the resources that must
be devoted to pollution reduction in the next period reduce the gains of
investment in terms of future consumption, and therefore, the increase in
future consumption is not as large as in a model with no environmental
consideration. The discount rate used to evaluate projects with environ-
mental concerns should then be lower than the marginal productivity of
capital that is generally used for discounting. Weitzman's (1994) argu-
ment is based on the premise that some future costs in terms of pollution
are not taken into account when evaluating projects with environmental
concerns. This implicitly supposes that courts cannot correctly value
the costs of environmental accidents when imposing compensating and
punitive damages to polluters. In that case, compensation payments un-
derestimate the environmental loss, that is, the real social cost is X +A
with A > 0. The socially optimal level of investment is then I

such
that:
K
0
(I

) + p
0
(I

)(X +A) = 0
where I

> I

.
If the social loss X + A is large compared to the monetary loss X ,
the imposition of bank liability yielding investment I

is not desirable
as it keeps investment away from its socially ecient level. On the other
hand, if banks are not liable, rms overinvest and, hence, may pick an
investment level closer to I

. In a more detailed model, one could
determine the optimal level of bank liability as a function of A. For
example, if the contractual investment I when there is no bank liability
is larger than the socially optimal level I

, the introduction of partial
bank liability could become ecient. If I

is known by the legislator,
it is possible to calibrate the optimal degree of bank liability such that
the bank and the rm agree to invest exactly I

. If A is low, however,
I

' I

, and bank liability is a good policy in that it improves the
risk-sharing obtained by rms and keeps investment close to the socially
ecient one.
We only make the point here that if courts underestimate the social
costs of environmental accidents, bank liability may have unsuspected
costs in terms of underinvestment in environmental protection. The
legislator has to keep in mind that bank liability reduces the incentives
for risk reduction investments. The legislator must then be aware of the
dierence between the compensation courts can impose ex post (X) and
the real and unknown consequences of accidents (X +A).
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6 Conclusion
Court judgments that followed the introduction of CERCLA actually
justied the imposition of bank liability by the fact that banks had close
and long relationships with rms and, hence, possibly an inuence on
their decisions. Firms and banks entering in contractual relationships
take into account bank liability when writing contracts, and therefore,
the consequences of past court decisions have an impact on environmen-
tal prevention.
When rms are risk averse, the usual limited liability investment
reducing eect is mitigated by the will to smooth dividends through
states of nature. Giving a part of the environmental risk to rms can
then have a positive eect on their risk reducing behavior. Hence, even
if environmental accidents cause bankruptcy, rms have an incentive to
avoid the bankruptcy states and can invest more (in the absence of bank
liability) than what risk-neutral rms with limited liability would do.
Laws such as CERCLA seek to apply the principle that polluters
should pay for the pollution they generate. These laws then reduce the
social burden of environmental risks in two ways: rst, because com-
pensation payments do not have to be supported by tax-payers' money;
second, because they provide better incentives for prevention. If the
search for a payer entails the legislator to turn against banks, however,
the nancial system can suer distortions whose consequences on the
pollution level are uneasily quantiable. As is shown here, bank liability
reduces the part of risk that rms incur (which is an ecient conse-
quence) and their incentives to prevent such risks (which is an inecient
consequence), and this, even if investment inprevention is observable.
Whether bank liability is a good policy or not depends in part on the eval-
uation courts make of the social costs of environmental accidents. The
eects of bank liability characterized here have to be weighted against
benets in terms of monitoring and auditing of rms' prevention activi-
ties when such activities are not directly enforceable in a contract (see,
for example, Boyer and Laont, 1997).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The rst-order conditions for dividends are:
(1, p(I))u
0
(c
s0
1
) = (1, p(I))+ 
s0
8s
p(I)u
0
(c
sX
1
) = p(I)+ 
sX
8s
(1, p(I))u
0
(c
z
2
(s; 0)) = (1, p(I)) + 
s0
8z
p(I)u
0
(c
z
2
(s;X)) = p(I)+ 
sX
8z:
These conditions clearly imply that c
sx
1
= c
z
2
(s; x) for all z. Furthermore,
they do not depend on the assumptions for k
s
. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Self-enforcing constraints imply that (1, )c
sx
 y
s
, x+ k
s
x=X + y.
The upper bound on dividends is then (y
s
, x + k
s
x=X + y)=(1, ).
It is increasing in Y
sx
 y
s
, x+ k
s
x=X .
Suppose that there are two states such that Y
s
0
x
0
> Y
sx
with c
s
0
x
0
< c
sx
.
By rst-order conditions, it cannot be the case that 
s
0
x
0
= 
sx
= 0, since
this would imply c
s
0
x
0
= c
sx
. It cannot also be the case that 
s
0
x
0
> 0
and 
sx
> 0, since dividends would be equal to their respective upper
bound, and would thus be increasing in Y . Since c
s
0
x
0
< c
sx
, it must
therefore be the case that 
s
0
x
0
> 0 and 
sx
= 0. But this implies that
c
s
0
x
0
= (Y
s
0
x
0
+ y)=(1, ) > (Y
sx
+ y)=(1, )  c
sx
;
a contradiction of our initial assumption. This proves that dividends are
weakly increasing in y
s
, x+ k
s
x=X . Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1:
1. This follows directly from Proposition 2 when k
s
= 0.
2. When k
s
= X , Y
s0
= Y
sX
. Self-enforcing constraints are then
the same in states s0 and sX . Both 
s0
= 
sX
= 0 or 
s0
> 0
and 
sX
> 0 imply c
s0
= c
sX
. Either assumption c
s0
> c
sX
or
c
s0
< c
sX
leads to a contradiction.
3. This follows directly from Proposition 2 when k
s
2 (0; X).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3:
1. We rst show that 
S0
= 0. Suppose not. Then, 
sx
> 0 for all
states (s; x) (since dividends are increasing in Y
sx
. We can then
characterize the dividend level in each state using self-enforcing
constraints:
(1 + )c
s0
= y
s
+ y 8s
(1 + )c
sX
= y
s
,X + k
s
+ y 8s:
Substituting dividends in the bank's participation constraint yields:
,
K(I)

, p(I)E
s
k
s
< 0:
For any values for fk
s
g
s
, the bank's participation constraint cannot
hold if all self-enforcing constraints bind. Then, at least one self-
enforcing constraint does not bind. Hence, 
S0
= 0 by Proposition
2. This implies that u
0
(c
S0
) = . The rst-order condition for
investment is then:
K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X =
(1 + )p
0
(I)

E
s
[u(c
sX
), u(c
s0
)]
u
0
(c
S0
)
+ E
s
(c
s0
, c
sX
)

;
which implies:
K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X =
(1 + )p
0
(I)E
s
[(u(c
sX
)=u
0
(c
S0
), c
sX
), (u(c
s0
)=u
0
(c
S0
), c
s0
)]:
Dene f(c
sx
) = u(c
sx
)=u
0
(c
S0
),c
sx
:Then, f
0
(c
sx
) = u
0
(c
sx
)=u
0
(c
S0
),
1.
Since c
S0
 c
sx
for all (s; x), u
0
(c
sx
)=u
0
(c
S0
)  1, and the func-
tion f is weakly increasing. Given c
sX
 c
s0
we have f(c
sX
) 
f(c
s0
) for all s 2 S. It follows that:
K
0
(I) + p
0
(I)X = (1 + )p
0
(I)E
s
[f(c
sX
), f(c
s0
)]  0:
Since the l.h.s. is increasing, this implies that there is overinvest-
ment compared to the full-commitment optimal level.
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2. If there is full liability, c
sX
= c
s0
for all s, and then K
0
(I) +
p
0
(I)X = 0, which means that investment is at its full-commitment
optimal level. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Denote c
s0
= c
s
for all s and remember that  = u
0
(c
S
)  u
0
(c
s
) for all s.
Assume that K(I)=(1,p(I)) is increasing in I . The bank's participation
constraint is binding at the optimum in the non-commitment problem,
that is, (1 + )E
s
c
s
+ K(

I)=(1 , p(

I)) = (1 + )y, and in the full
commitment problem: (1+)c+K(
^
I)=(1, p(
^
I)) = (1+)y. Hence,
(1 + )E
s
c
s
+K(

I)=(1, p(

I)) = (1 + )c+K(
^
I)=(1, p(
^
I)).
Now suppose that

I <
^
I . This impliesK(

I)=(1,p(

I)) < K(
^
I)=(1,p(
^
I))
since K(I)=(1, p(I)) is increasing, and then, E
s
c
s
> c.
Since (u(c), u(0))=u
0
(c), c is increasing and if it is convex, we have
u(c), u(0)
u
0
(c)
, c <
u(E
s
c
s
), u(0)
u
0
(E
s
c
s
)
, E
s
c
s
 E
s
[
u(c
s
), u(0)
u
0
(c
s
)
, c
s
]  E
s
[
u(c
s
), u(0)
u
0
(c
S
)
, c
s
]
Then, evaluating equation (10) for the allocations fc
s
g gives
1

K
0
(
^
I) + (1 + )p
0
(
^
I)

y +E
s

u(c
s
), u(0)
u
0
(c
S
)
, c
s

< 0:
That is,

I >
^
I and this contradicts the initial assertion. Then it must be
that

I 
^
I , that is, the self-enforcing contract involves overinvestment
compared to the full commitment optimal level
^
I . Q.E.D.
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